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The forces of “globalization” are transforming virtually every industrial sector 
in Canada including financial services retail distribution. Observers who 
downplay its significance tend to take a short-run view of the matter, pointing 
to what has not yet been affected greatly by globalization rather than to how a 
continuation of current developments will change the economy and its sectors 
over the next decade.
2 Because of the mobility of capital, financial services 
sectors have already been heavily affected by globalization.  
                                                             
1Some of the analysis included here is taken from Neufeld (2000). 
2For an effective portrayal of current and prospect changes driven by globalization 
see Friedman (1999). 
How well is the Canadian financial system including its regulatory regime, 
positioned to deal with globalization? This paper addresses that question, and 
mainly as it relates to the Canadian banking system, by: (i) referring to past 
evolution of the system and how current challenges differ from past ones; (ii) 
identifying the challenges that the current environment has generated — in 
part by examining the stresses and strains revealed by the Asian financial 
crisis and its lessons for achieving stable and efficient financial systems; (iii) 
appraising the extent to which the Canadian banking system and its regulatory 
framework, as well as current Canadian financial services policy, is in tune  
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with addressing those challenges; and (iv) drawing some conclusions of 





The Evolution of the Canadian Banking System 
 
 
The need to adapt to changing circumstances and opportunities is nothing 
new for the Canadian banking system. Over its history of almost two 
centuries the growth and development of the system has involved: geographic 
expansion; industry consolidation; expansion in the range of financial services 
offered; and innovation in the delivery of services. The process was greatly 
assisted early on by innovations in transportation technology  — 
transcontinental trains; and in communications technology — telegraph and 
telephone. By the end of the 1920s domestic geographic expansion and 
industry consolidation had g one a very long way. However, product and 
product delivery innovations were minimal until after the Second World War.  
Currently, with the domestic market relatively mature, both in terms of 
geographic coverage and product offerings, the only significant frontier left 
for the system is that of international financial services. The most important 
question now is whether the Canadian legislative framework and the ingenuity 
of the banks will be such as to see the system survive strongly in Canada and 
abroad in the face of the forces of global competition that have become a 
permanent feature of the system and are likely to increase in intensity.  
It is useful to examine these evolutionary forces in somewhat more detail. 
 
 
The Period before World War II 
 
The chartered banks first typically emerged in the larger urban centres, with 
smaller urban and rural communities being served by local private bankers 
and money lenders, including the activities of accountancy and law offices. 
The banks then began to extend their reach into the hinterlands — which saw 
the emergence of the historically important innovation of the branch system 
and its effective administration — the latter involving not just new accounting 
and control procedures and practices but new human resource policies as 
well, as personnel that were required to move around far-flung branch 
systems.   
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This experience and new regional opportunities combined to enable the 
banks to extend their reach beyond their own hinterland to neighbouring 
provinces and, simply following trade, to the Caribbean region. As they did so 
it became evident that structural changes to the banking system were 
necessary in order to take advantage of the inviting presence of banking 
opportunities in the widely dispersed regions, and to serve their communities 
efficiently. These structural changes took two major forms: the disappearance 
of local private bankers and money lenders as the more efficient bank 
branches began to serve local communities, and major consolidation among 
the banks through mergers and acquisitions as they sought to meet the new 
dimensions of “optimum size” dictated by a greatly expanded market.  
The structural changes that emerged were quite dramatic. It would appear 
that in the 1890s there were close to 200 private banking offices in Canada 
most of which had disappeared by the 1920s; on the other hand, while in 
1890 there were 426 bank branches, in 1920 there were 4,676.
3 Whereas in 
1890 there were about 11,300 Canadians per branch this had declined to 
below 3,000 by the 1920s and represented long-term density maturity. At the 
same time the number of chartered banks diminished dramatically. In 1870 
there were 30 active chartered banks while by 1930 these had been reduced 
to ten. Mergers played a very significant role in enabling the emergence of 
institutions of a size appropriate to the breadth of the Canadian market and to 
the then demands of international business.
4  
                                                             
3See Neufeld (1972) for a full analysis of the development of the Canadian banking 
system.  
4A significant example of this was the emergence of the Royal Bank of Canada. It 
began operations as a small chartered bank in 1871. From 1910 to 1925 it effected five 
strategically important mergers. Consequently, whereas it accounted for under 4 per cent of 
bank assets in 1910, by 1930 it had 27 per cent, 
 
making it the largest chartered bank in Canada. See McDowall (1993, ch. 4) and Neufeld 
(1972, p. 99). 
In Canada, in contrast to the United States, government policy did not 
impede these major structural changes that led to the development of national 
branch systems and consolidation among the banks, to the substantial benefit 
of the Canadian economy with its relatively small population and large 
territorial expanse.  
While the Canadian chartered banks were highly successful in growing 
their institutions by increasing their geographical reach within Canada and by 
mergers and acquisitions, they were much less imaginative in doing so 
through expanding the range of their products, as indicated by the relatively 
static character of their liability instruments and assets over many decades  
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prior to the Second World War, and the relative absence of non-
intermediation services. On the sources of funds (i.e., liabilities) side of their 
activities they did begin to develop actively the simple savings deposit in the 
late 1860s, in addition to their chequing account business, and this turned out 
to be highly significant for their future growth, but no further important 
liability instrument innovations appeared until after the Second World War.  
As for their lending activities, they saw themselves essentially as 
providers of short-term business loans, with peripheral activity in areas such 
as federal, provincial, municipal and corporate securities remaining relatively 
small. One bank in the 1930s found a way of circumventing the interest rate 
ceiling in order to develop consumer instalment credit, but the business 
remained small and its lead was not followed by the other banks. Not until 
well after World War II did they take consumer lending seriously and they 
waited long before starting to lobby for mortgage-lending powers. 
In the meantime, their intermediary competitors moved ahead and their 
share of the financial intermediary business declined steadily — from 73 per 
cent in 1870 to 40 per cent in 1940. Their mortgage loan, trust and insurance 
company competitors pioneered mortgage lending, both industrial and 
residential, the small loan companies and money lenders developed consumer 
credit; while that wonderful savings instrument — the automatic periodic 
payment — was for long largely the preserve of the life insurance companies, 
it was also adopted by the mutual fund companies which emerged in the 
1930s. Trust companies in the 1920s succeeded in achieving legislative 
changes that enabled them to enter the historic preserve of the banks — the 
deposit business — as did the credit unions and caisses populaires. 
This lethargy on the part of the banks in product development cannot be 
explained by legislative constraints even though such constraints did exist. 
Over decades, the banks had been relatively successful in achieving desired 
changes in the  Bank Act during the decennial reviews. The overriding 
perception among the banks themselves was that they should confine 
themselves to gathering demand and savings deposits and this, it was felt, 
dictated that they confine themselves essentially to providing short-term, 
self-liquidating business credit. 
 
 
The Period after World War II 
 
Geographic expansion and increasing branch density had been largely 
exhausted as a way of growing the banking system prior to World War II. But 
growth through expansion of the product range had great potential. It emerged 
slowly and in the two very important cases of consumer credit and mortgage  
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lending, it came as much through the desire of the government as through the 
lobbying of the banks. The 1937 Home Improvement Loans Guarantee Act, 
which protected the banks against losses up to 15 per cent, was followed in 
1954 by the National Housing Act, under which the banks began to offer 
government-guaranteed residential mortgage loans. Not until 1962 did the 
banks begin to argue for broad mortgage lending powers and these emerged in 
the next Bank Act, the one of 1967.  
Similarly so with consumer credit. The step taken by the Canadian Bank 
of Commerce in 1936 to offer consumer instalment loans under accounting 
that enabled them to charge more than the maximum legal interest rate, a step 
tolerated benignly by the government, was not followed by the other banks. 
The 1954 Bank Act permitted the banks to take chattel mortgages as security 
but not until 1958, when the Bank of Nova Scotia entered the consumer 
credit field aggressively did the rest follow.  
Innovation in instruments for raising funds also came slowly. In 1959 the 
Canadian Bankers’ Association appointed a committee of three, two bankers 
and one outsider (the writer) to examine the feasibility of forming an active 
short-term money market with emphasis on bankers’ acceptances. But only 
gradually did a full array of term notes, debentures, bankers’ acceptances and 
a variety of savings plans appear. In the 1960s all the chartered banks became 
associated with mutual fund companies and in time this evolved into a major 
area of activity. There then emerged a virtual explosion of innovation in how 
services were delivered with the move into credit cards, beginning with 
CHARGEX, then VISA and MASTERCARD, and some years later 
individual bank cards and automated teller machines (ATM), then debit cards, 
telephone banking and finally Internet banking.  
Of great significance for achieving growth through widening the range of 
services offered was the permission granted to banks in 1987 to acquire 
investment dealers and in 1992 to acquire trust companies. This, together 
with their burgeoning mutual fund business paved the way for them to 
become major players in wealth management and related services. The 
acquisition of dealers was also important for their lending activities in that it 
enabled them to provide the full range of corporate financing services, not 
simply demand and term bank loans as they had done over much of their 
history. Special departments for loans to small and medium-sized businesses 
as well as separate venture capital arrangements were also developed by the 
banks individually. 
As a result of this broadening of the range of services offered, the banks 
succeeded in achieving a rate of growth that maintained their relative position 
in financial intermediation in Canada and increased somewhat their share in 
the provision of non-intermediary services such as wealth management. But  
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by the end of the twentieth century the potential for further growth in Canada 
through broadening even further the range of services appeared to have been 
largely exhausted — apart from branch distribution of life insurance and car 
leasing, both of which they were prohibited from entering by federal 
government legislation. In short, just as geographic reach and branch density 
had been essentially exhausted prior to the Second World War, by the end of 
the twentieth century the potential for growth through expansion of product 
range in Canada had also been largely exhausted. 
The challenge for future growth and development that this has posed for 
the C anadian banks is clear. They can be content with serving the very 
mature Canadian market and accept the low rate of growth that this implies or 
they can begin to extend their reach seriously beyond Canada’s borders just 
as in the late nineteenth century they had begun to extend their reach beyond 
their local communities and home province into Canada as a whole.  
However, either is easier said than done because of a new development 
that exploded in the 1990s, namely globalization and global competition. On 
the one hand, this phenomenon has the potential for challenging the banks in 
their own domestic market — a new development that will reduce further the 
opportunities for growth in the already mature domestic market; and on the 
other hand it has imposed new prerequisites for banks wishing to become 
respectable players outside their home market. Domestically, the banks must 
be as efficient as possible in terms of the cost and quality of service or their 
market share will be eroded by international institutions; while being effective 
international players requires them to have a size that enables them to capture 
the economies of scale enjoyed by their much larger international 
competitors.  
The issue that emerges is whether the Canadian banking system and the 
legislation governing it are poised to meet the challenges of globalization over 




Implications of Globalization for the  
Canadian Financial System 
 
 
Globalization is a permanent, non-reversible phenomenon. Canadian financial 
services policies based on the assumption that domestic financial systems are 
heavily protected from external influences, as was the case over past decades, 
will be ineffective and, indeed, counterproductive. They risk undermining  
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rather than strengthening the domestic financial system. A recent book on the 
subject of globalization has noted that:  
 
the globalization system, unlike the Cold War system, is not static, but a dynamic 
ongoing process: globalization involves the inexorable integration of markets, 
nation-states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before — in a way that 
is enabling individuals, corporations and nation-states to reach around the world 
farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before, and in a way that is also 
producing a powerful backlash from those brutalized or left behind by this new 
system. (Friedman, 1999, pp. 7-8) 
 
There are a number of important implications for the Canadian financial 
system of this worldwide trend. How Canadian policy deals with some of 
them will determine whether the Canadian financial system will be 





Increased Foreign Competition within Canada 
 
Canada’s domestic market will be challenged by non-Canadian institutions 
much more so in the future than in the past. Telecommunication innovations 
and the decline in telecommunication costs — microchips, satellites, fibre 
optics, the Internet — are breaking down regional, international and institu-
tional barriers that had previously protected institutions from external forces. 
The nineteenth century equivalent of this was the massive improvement in 
transportation and decline in transportation costs, as well as the improvement 
in communications through the telephone and telegraph which were pre-
requisites for breaking down regional barriers to nation-wide banking and 
financial services generally. The break-down of international boundaries by 
rapidly developing information and communication technologies will naturally 
lead to an increase in the share of the Canadian financial services market 
going to non-Canadian financial institutions.  
 
 
Increased Importance of International Competitiveness 
 
The ability of Canadian institutions to withstand increasing foreign 
competition will depend on their economic efficiency relative to that of the 
encroaching competitors. In the past when the threat of foreign competition  
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was unimportant it did not much matter for Canadian financial institutions if 
government policy impeded the move to a more efficient system, the only 
ones suffering being the users of financial services. But now non-Canadian 
institutions with greater scale advantages can use rapidly emerging technology 
to deliver highly reliable and competitive financial services to the home or 
office. Canadian clients are likely to be quite receptive to such services since 
they are among world leaders in the adoption of Internet services, including 
banking services. Therefore, it is simply a matter of time before most of them 
will routinely use the Internet for accessing banking and other financial 
services.  
Not only does this mean that new non-Canadian institutions have much 
easier access to the Canadian market than previously, but Canadians will 
become increasingly indifferent as to whether they are dealing with Canadian 
or non-Canadian institutions. Such new competition in itself is beneficial to 
Canadians, but if the edge is given to non-Canadian institutions because of 
costly legislative constraints imposed on domestic institutions then the 
outcome is undesirable both for the long-term prospects of the domestic 
financial system and for the efficiency of resource allocation within the 
financial services sector. The challenge for Canadian policy is to remove such 
constraints, some of which, as noted later, are currently of concern. 
 
 
Obsolescence of Past Measures of “Optimum Size” 
 
The forces that have facilitated globalization of financial services have also 
made obsolete past measures of economies of scale and of the “optimum” 
size of financial institutions, and past guidelines concerning excessive 
domestic market concentration are no longer reliable. Month after month 
cases emerge in a large number of countries of already large financial 
institutions increasing their market reach and reducing their operating costs 
through mergers with other large institutions. That is, the technological 
revolution is changing the parameters concerning the relationship between size 
and efficiency so that data relating to past size/efficiency experiences are no 
longer a reliable guide for the future. At the same time the concern in earlier 
years that this would lead to problems of inadequate domestic competition are 
increasingly irrelevant. They are being made irrelevant because financial 
services clients increasingly can source a wide variety of financial services 
from abroad as well as from a growing range of foreign and domestic 
institutions within domestic markets.  
Recent Canadian policy of, in effect, preventing mergers between the 
larger banks stands out as an exception to what is happening in most of the  
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industrialized countries. There are already disturbing indications that the 
Canadian banks do not have the size to support certain large international and 
domestic financial activities. For example, they have all exited the payroll 
business and, all but one, the custodial trust business, their places taken by 
foreign institutions. Also in March 2001, the Royal Bank of Canada 
announced that it would be selling RT Capital Management, its equity 




                                                             
5The Canadian institutions had been inhibited in building up their foreign equity 
management teams because of the prolonged Canadian restrictions on the foreign content of 
Canadian pension plans — an example of regulative restrictions causing permanent damage 
to the Canadian financial system. 
System Growth Dependent on Competitiveness at  
Home and Abroad 
 
For Canadian financial institutions to experience solid growth in the future will 
require them to be internationally competitive at home and abroad. Not only, 
as noted earlier, is the Canadian financial services market a very mature one 
but it will be increasingly challenged by non-Canadian institutions. Therefore 
the future growth of Canadian financial institutions will depend on them 
expanding their international activities, especially in the United States. But in 
order to do this successfully they will need both to be internationally 
competitive in their home market and to have a size that enables them to 
compete aggressively abroad.  
The Canadian banks have already slipped a long way down the list of 
important international financial institutions as measured by the size of their 
assets and of their capital bases; and current government policy impediments 
to mergers among the big banks means in my view that non-interest costs are 
10–20 per cent higher than they would be if mergers were permitted. The 
result is that current attempts by the large banks to establish a stronger 
presence in the United States while entirely appropriate, and indeed very 
necessary, are limited both by domestic operations that are more costly than 
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Inevitability of Increased Foreign Ownership 
 
The forces of globalization will generate a persistent tendency towards 
increased foreign ownership of Canadian financial institutions as has already 
begun to happen, and to an increase in non-Canadian executives running 
them. International institutional and other investors seeking long-term profit 
maximization through balancing their investments over a wide spectrum, are 
increasingly indifferent to the national origin of the investments. This alone 
will lead to an increase in foreign ownership of Canadian companies. 
Furthermore, as Canadian institutions acquire foreign institutions through 
share exchanges in order to grow their business, as in a recent case,
6 the 
degree of foreign ownership will increase. Also in order to be internationally 
competitive it will be necessary for Canadian institutions to seek executive 
talent where they can find it. Since Canada’s own supply is much smaller 
than the international pool, this will inevitably mean more non-Canadians 
running Canadian institutions. Boards of directors will have a growing number 
of non-Canadian members as business activities are globalized.
7 
Neither of these developments are ones that Canadian policy can or 
should combat. But they increase the urgency for Canadian policy to be in 
harmony with enabling domestic financial institutions to be as competitive 
domestically and internationally as possible and to avoid actually hastening the 
trend towards foreign ownership and control by weakening the relative 










                                                             
6On January 26, 2001, the Royal Bank announced that it intended to acquire 
Centura Banks Inc. of North Carolina for $3.5 billion through an exchange of shares. 
7The number of U.S. residents who are directors of Canadian companies increased 
from 10 per cent in 1995 to 15 per cent in 1999. See National Post, February 5, 2001, p. 
C1.  
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Weaknesses of Financial Systems  
Revealed by Globalization  
 
 
The Asian Financial Crisis Experience  
 
How well, over-all, is the Canadian financial system placed to survive 
financial globalization? A useful way to address this question is to examine 
how the Canadian system stands up against the weaknesses in certain 
financial systems revealed by the Asian financial crisis — a crisis that was 
largely triggered by the forces inherent in financial globalization. For domestic 
financial systems to survive globalization will involve correcting or avoiding 
such weaknesses. 
Many of the weaknesses revealed by the Asian financial crisis had existed 
within the various financial systems for many years. What brought them to 
the fore was first the easy access of official and private institutions to short-
term capital brought about by the globalization of financial markets and then 
the shock imposed on domestic financial systems of the sudden flight of that 
capital at the first signs of economic difficulties. Stabilization of conditions in 
those systems involved not just the historically well-known adjustment to 
cyclical distortions but correction of newly revealed and deep-seated 
structural problems — the principal reason why the crisis was as severe and 
long-lasting as it turned out to be. 
The more important financial system weaknesses revealed by the Asian 
financial crisis may briefly be noted in order to judge how the Canadian 
system stands up against them.  
Macroeconomic policies. In some cases the macroeconomic policy 
environment was destabilizing: monetary policy was late in taking action to 
restore price stability which was even more important than fiscal imbalances 
in as much as the latter was not a problem in most Asian countries during the 
crisis; and policies of fixed exchange rates resulted in exchange values being 
held at artificially high levels having in mind the failure of macroeconomic 
policies to protect their real values.  
Structural deficiencies among financial institutions. Domestic policies 
to a substantial degree shielded domestic financial institutions from 
international competition. For example, while the United Kingdom introduced 
major reforms in 1986, Japan ignored this example until the late 1990s. 
Consequently system rationalization was delayed and serious “moral hazard” 
problems existed within it, that is, the belief among private institutions that 
government would rescue them in time of trouble. At the same time the  
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detailed regulation of the systems prevented the emergence of efficiency-
generating competition within them. Mergers, acquisitions and even 
bankruptcies were made very difficult, thereby tending to “freeze” existing 
system structures at a time when exploding technology and growing 
international pressures were making such systems obsolete and highly 
vulnerable to life-threatening attacks. The lesson that emerged from all this 
was that regulations that operate against, instead of in harmony with market 
forces are not likely to be effective indefinitely. In most of the industrialized 
countries, including most recently the United States, old structures were 
permitted to be transformed through the playing out of market forces and this 
process is continuing through seemingly endless mergers, acquisitions and 
even bankruptcies.  
Structural deficiencies within corporate operations. In retrospect it 
became clear that many private sector corporations had hidden deteriorating 
conditions from the view of public markets. This lack of transparency in 
accounting, weak financial controls, deficient bankruptcy laws, and in-
adequate internal risk management permitted abuses to multiply, of which 
investors were unaware until crisis conditions had been created. 
Structural deficiencies within domestic regulatory agencies. The 
sudden very large flows of short-term international capital to a wide range of 
private financial and non-financial institutions created risks for which 
regulatory agencies were unprepared. Inadequate reporting requirements, as 
for example, exposure to short-term capital outflows and the use of 
derivatives, poorly trained regulators  and the absence of effective 
international co-operation among regulators were weaknesses that suddenly 
stood out as the crisis developed. In addition, governments, by hiding 
deteriorating conditions from markets caused the inevitable adjustment to be 
more severe than it need have been. An important example of this was the 
concealment of deteriorat-ing official foreign exchange reserve positions. Just 
as policies of stability required much more transparency in corporate 
operations so it was required of official operations. 
Structural deficiencies in multilateral surveillance. One of the most 
significant weaknesses revealed by the Asian financial crisis was the 
unpreparedness of the multilateral institutions to deal with international 
financial system problems. Neither the International Monetary Fund nor other 
multilateral institutions had concerned themselves with structural problems in 
member country financial systems, for the most part confining themselves to 
issues of macroeconomic stability and industrial development projects and 
policies. Recent multilateral efforts, in which Canada is playing an active part, 
to strengthen domestic financial systems, improve the quality of domestic 
regulators, establish international standards in the operations of financial  
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institutions and of regulators, constitute serious attempts at addressing these 
weaknesses. 
How the Canadian financial system measures up against those 
deficiencies. The Canadian financial system measures up quite well when 
judged against the weaknesses revealed by the Asian financial crisis. The 
fundamental strength of the Canadian financial system was demonstrated by 
the fact that it, as were those of the other western industrial countries, was 
relatively untouched by the crisis. Monetary policy was unequivocally 
directed towards maintaining a low rate of inflation and the Bank of Canada 
adopted a policy of increasing transparency in its operations. Low inflation 
and the move towards budget surpluses provided a stable environment for the 
financial system and the floating exchange rate removed the risk that the rate 
would be out of line with market forces.  
Not that the exchange rate policy was and is now without controversy. 
Some would attribute the weak Canadian dollar over recent years to the 
maintenance of relatively high taxes, excessive government expenditures and 
inadequate reduction of the public debt, while others would attribute it 
essentially to weak commodity prices. Be that as it may, the floating exchange 
rate regime contributed to financial system stability in contrast to the fixed 
rate systems in many Asian countries  — systems that collapsed under 
pressure. 
Also contributing to stability is the fact that the federal government 
regulatory system overseeing Canadian financial institutions, as distinct from 
certain regulations themselves, is of high quality by international standards, 
including the quality of its regulatory personnel. Canada recognized the need 
to greatly improve international surveillance of the international  financial 
system because of the many-faceted implications of financial globalization. 
The prime minister raised the issue at the Halifax G7 summit of 1995 and the 
minister of finance did so at various international fora. When the Group of 
Twenty was formed to work towards a more stable international financial 
system the Canadian finance minister was asked to be its first chairman. 
Furthermore the chairman of the Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation 
was asked to head a subgroup under the newly formed Financial Stability 
Forum to make recommendations on deposit insurance; and Toronto was 
chosen as the location for the new International Centre for Leadership in 
Financial Sector Supervision. 
Also many, although not all, of the historic barriers between the “four 
pillars” of financial institutions (banks, trusts, investment dealers and 
insurance companies) have disappeared, thereby increasing competition 
between them, and there is a strong foreign presence in most areas of the 
system, including increasingly in the banking system.  
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The need for transparency in corporate operations and for strong 
corporate governance practices has been emphasized by official regulators 
and by self-regulating institutions. As a result, for example, corporate reports, 
including those of the banks, are more informative for investors than in past 
years and many, although not yet all, annual reports now include a section 
outlining how the corporation’s governance practices match up against the 
guidelines laid out by the Toronto Stock Exchange.  
These favourable developments lay back of the ease with which the 
Canadian financial system withstood the international pressures created by the 
Asian financial crisis and demonstrated that the system had many strengths in 
going against increased global competition.  
In addition, there is evidence in the recent acquisition actions of Canadian 
banks in the United States that they understand well that their future 
prosperity will depend on the development of their North American base, and 
not just their Canadian base.
8 
Unfortunately, there is one significant aspect of Canadian financial 
services policy that appears not to measure up well against the lessons learned 
from the Asian financial crisis and so risks undermining the future 
competitiveness of the system. This refers to the fundamental importance of 
permitting structural changes of a kind that reflect the pressure of new forces 




Bill C-8: Canadian Policy for Confronting Globalization 
 
 
Prior to the federal election of 2000 the Canadian government tabled Bill 
C-38, a massive bill intended to introduce a large number of changes to the 
law governing the operation of federal financial institutions in Canada. This 
legislation appeared after the publication of the Report of the Task Force on 
the Future of the Canadian Financial System in September 1998 (the 
                                                             
8A  few  recent  examples  may  suffice.  Toronto  Dominion  Bank  is  the 
largest shareholder of TD Waterhouse, a leading international brokerage firm. The Bank of 
Montreal through its U.S. subsidiary, Harris Bank, is acquiring First National Bank of Joliet. 
The Royal Bank is acquiring Centura Banks Inc. with assets of $11.5 billion; prior to that it 
acquired Security First Network Bank, an Internet bank; also Prism Financial Corp., a 
mortgage company; Liberty Life Insurance Co.; and Dain Rauscher Corp., a full service 
securities firm.   
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Mackay Report) and the government’s policy paper of June 25, 1999, entitled 
Reforming Canada’s Financial Services Sector: A Framework for the 
Future. That Bill died with the call of an election. It, however, was 
reintroduced as Bill C-8 in February 2001 and received Royal Assent a few 
months later. Bill C-8 introduced no policy changes from Bill C-38 although it 
did correct a number of errors and ambiguities that hasty drafting had left in 
that first bill. Space does not permit a detailed review here of the merits of all 
the measures included in that bill. Therefore this discussion focuses on those 





Some measures in the bill are presented as intending to increase competition 
in the Canadian financial services market. But others, in practice, will have 
the opposite effect.  
Opening up the payments system to life insurance companies, securities 
dealers and money market funds will tend to increase competition marginally 
in the payments area. But encouraging the formation of new small banks, 
“community-based banks” as the Department of Finance Press Release puts 
it, by lowering capital requirements from $10 million to $5 million goes 
directly against the evolution of banking systems most everywhere. Not only 
is it unlikely to increase competition but it is more likely to lead to future bank 
failures and a drain on the reserves of the Canada Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. If the attempt is made to offset this risk with strict regulations 
and higher deposit insurance premiums for the upstart banks, then the 
measure will likely be still-born in terms of its results.  
The government wishes to facilitate the credit union movement in 
developing national services entities that may help the movement to survive in 
a market where economies of scale come from large electronic management 
and delivery systems. This is quite appropriate although there is little in the 
bill that will lead specifically to that end. Its eventual impact on competition is 
likely to be minimal. (It is slightly ironic that here policy recognizes that large 
systems are needed for survival while elsewhere the bill envisages achieving 
increased competition through encouraging the formation of new local banks.)  
Several measures over the last few years have given increased flexibility 
to foreign banks in the Canadian market including the valuable ability to 
engage in wholesale banking through branches of the parent company instead 
of through the more costly route of a Canadian subsidiary. Foreign bank 
subsidiaries in Canada have always had all the business and investment 
powers of Canadian banks and all size limitations on them have been  
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removed. Bill C-8 ensures that they will have all the new investment and 
business powers being granted to Canadian banks. This, taken by itself, is 
appropriate since more competition is better than less. However, some 
measures of Bill C-8, including details of policy not embedded in the bill 
itself, will have the effect of dampening the ability of Canadian banks to 
compete with foreign banks. 
The discriminatory measures that will have this effect include the 
restrictive and politicized bank merger policy which, for some time, risks 
preventing Canadian banks from achieving the economies of scale that their 
much larger international competitors are achieving; the continued prohibition 
against the distribution of life insurance through bank branches, which directly 
restricts competition in the Canadian market and indirectly does so by making 
bank branches less productive than they could be; the continued exclusion of 
the banks from the car leasing business, a business almost completely 
dominated by foreign institutions — a quite incredible case of Canadian law 
restricting competition in a Canadian market by keeping Canadian institutions 
from competing with foreign institutions in the Canadian market place; the 
threat in the bill directed at the large Canadian banks, and not at smaller 
competing institutions or foreign institutions located in Canada or entering the 
Canadian market through the Internet, that if they do not provide certain low-
cost services they will be forced to do so.  
But the most glaring weakness of the new policy as concerns competition 
is its failure to recognize clearly that by far the most important source of 
future competition will be large international institutions operating directly in 
Canada and through the Internet from outside Canada. There is little 
recognition that the most important issue for Canada will be the survival of at 





One of the most significant aspects of globalization and the technological 
revolution that is driving it is the impact it is having on what constitutes 
economically efficient private sector institutions. The development of large-
scale electronic systems has changed what constitutes optimum-sized 
institutions and has facilitated enlarging the range of products and services 
that individual institutions can offer. In response to this, financial system 
restructuring is taking place in virtually all countries and the size of many 
international institutions has increased greatly through mergers and 
acquisitions.   
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Globalization is also changing past guidelines as to what constitutes 
concentration in the financial services industry. This is because of the growing 
importance of cross-border competitors and their ability to deliver services 
with ease from a wide range of out-of-country suppliers. Past guide-lines as 
to what constitutes excessive domestic concentration are becoming obsolete. 
Domestic restructuring and competition policies that fail to take these 
developments into account risk undermining the future competitiveness of 
domestic financial institutions. Some measures in Bill C-8 are helpful in this 
respect but other ones are not. Also, since many of the important details of 
the measures will emerge in regulations and many actions that institutions 
might want to take in response to them are subject to the discretionary 
approval of the minister, it is not always clear how things will work out in 
practice. 
Holding companies and investment and business powers. A positive 
change is one that permits the banks and life insurance companies to structure 
themselves under an upstream regulated non-operating holding company. 
This increased flexibility recognizes the great variety of activities now 
undertaken by those institutions and the fact that they need not be subject to 
identical regulatory oversight and so can be placed in separate subsidiaries of 
the holding company. Of course, the existing structure where subsidiaries are 
run off the parent operating company will remain as an option.  
Additional investment powers being granted also reflect the changing 
world. These include, for example, the ability of a bank to own retail and 
wholesale banks downstream. Also the “in-house” powers of the banks are 
broadened in information technology, subject to ministerial discretion, and 
regulations can be used to extend those powers as the government deems 
appropriate. However, prohibition on bank branch distribution of life 
insurance and bank participation in car leasing is perpetuated. 
Canadian large bank merger policy. Federal government policy relating 
to the merger of banks with equity in excess of $5 billion is outlined in the 
government document Merger Review Guidelines released along with Bill 
C-8, but is not reflected in any statute. Not being part of the bill itself the 
guidelines can be changed by the government with ease, which is fortunate or 
not depending on how such discretionary policy-making will be used. 
However, the process itself is tortuous in nature and subject at crucial stages 
to strong short-term political influences. It has been presented as having three 
stages. 
Stage 1: (a) the banks apply to the Competition Bureau, the Office of the 
Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) and the minister of finance for 
permission to merge, together with assessment information; (b) the banks 
must prepare a Public Interest Impact Assessment (PIIA) giving the business  
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case, costs and benefits to clients, details on branch closings and their impact, 
contribution to international competitiveness, employment impact, ability to 
adopt new technology, transition remedial steps contemplated, and impact on 
the structure of the industry; (c) the Competition Bureau and OSFI will 
review the proposal for competition and prudential considerations; (d) 
concurrently with the preceding reviews, the House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Finance and the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, 
Trade and Commerce (Senate Committee) will hold public hearings using the 
PIIA as their focal point; (e) the Competition Bureau and OSFI will report 
their views on competition and prudential aspects to the minister of finance, 
which documents the minister will make available for scrutiny to the Finance 
Committee and Senate Committee; (f) the latter two committees will report to 
the minister on the broad public interest issues raised by the merger proposal. 
Stage 2: The minister of finance, drawing in part on the information in the 
aforementioned reports will decide if the public interest, prudential, and 
competition issues raised, can be addressed. If he deems that they cannot be 
addressed then he will simply deny permission to merge. If he deems that 
they can be addressed he will authorize negotiation of remedies — the third 
stage. A significant flaw in this stage is that the minister must make his 
decision before the Competition Bureau and OSFI have spelled out the 
specific remedies they would regard as being satisfactory — ones that would 
lead them to recommend approval of the mergers. Such decision-making in 
the dark increases the risk that short-term political factors will predominate. 
Stage 3: Competition, prudential and public interest remedies will be 
negotiated with the banks by the Competition Bureau, OSFI and the 
Department of Finance. If the minister of finance judges the negotiations to 
have been successful then he will approve the amended merger proposal. If 
not, he will reject it.  
These guidelines include two improvements to those initially included in 
the government’s policy paper of June 1999. First, the government will seek 
to complete the whole process in a specified period of time: five months. 
Unfortunately there is an easy way around this in that it is “subject to the 
prerogatives of Parliament”. Second, the Senate Committee will be involved 
in the process, which is desirable in that it tends to be more professional and 
less political in nature than the House of Commons Finance Committee in its 
consideration of policy issues, particularly those relating to the banks. 
This process, while possessing a certain sequential logic to it, is flawed in 
that it is tortuous, and therefore inevitably subject to delays along the way, 
and risks being hostage at several crucial stages to short-term political 
considerations. The Finance  Committee has at times shown that its 
recommendations in matters of bank policy can be highly political in nature,  
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so there is no assurance that its recommendations would be based on 
objective analysis. The minister has the right to reject a proposal even before 
the Competition Bureau and OSFI have attempted to negotiate their concerns 
with the banks involved, as well as after, and the short-term political 
pressures on him can be decisive. A slightly different problem is that the 
Competition Bureau has indicated that it takes a two-year time perspective 
when appraising competition impacts of a merger — which largely misses the 
emerging competitive factors arising from changing technology and with it 
increasing cross-border competition, and risks delays in restructuring until it is 
too late to meet successfully emerging competitive forces. In addition, most 
significant mergers take at least two years to be consummated in prac-tice, 
and some more than that, another reason why a two-year perspective makes 
the Bureau’s merger analysis irrelevant. 
The restriction on mergers between large banks and large de-mutualized 
insurance companies is even stricter than that between large banks. They are 
simply forbidden. The effect is to deny the financial system the synergies in 
the distribution of insurance products and the utilization of large electronic 
systems that such integration would make possible — synergies that are being 
captured by competing international institutions of other industrial countries.  
Degree of Regulation and the Regulatory Environment. The govern-
ment’s press releases accompanying Bill C-8 refer to measures that stream-
line the regulatory process. The bill does reduce ministerial discretionary 
powers relating to past permitted banking activities. A positive step is giving 
the Superintendent full authority to approve certain applications, with 
automatic approval after 30 days if the Superintendent has not raised any 
objection. Unfortunately these would appear to be confined to matters of a 
relatively  routine nature, with the minister of finance retaining some 
discretionary authority in all the major new provisions of the legislation — 
investment and business powers, holding companies and consumer interests.  
The body of regulations that will spell out that discretionary authority is 
likely to be complex and in any case it will be difficult to document clearly 
what will and will not be permitted by such authority in specific cases. This 
extensive use of discretionary authority injects a high degree of uncertainty 
into the regulatory process. So, having in mind the complexity of the 
regulations that such discretionary authority will require and the uncertainty 
hanging over a system depending heavily on such authority, it is not likely 
that the regulatory system over-all will have been made more streamlined by 
Bill C-8. 
New compliance regulations will undoubtedly emerge from the 
establishment of a Financial Consumer Agency of Canada (FCAC) for 
enforcing the consumer provisions of Bill C-8. Branch closures will also be  
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subject to a more burdensome regulatory process including the possibility of 
imposition by FCAC of a consultative process in situations to be outlined in 
regulations.  
One of the more unhelpful and seemingly worthless parts of the new 
regulatory requirements is the obligation on federal financial institutions with 
more than $1 billion equity to publish “annual accountability statements that 
describe their contribution to the Canadian economy and society ... for 
example ... small business lending, charitable donations and community 
involvement, and the location of openings and closings of branches” (Finance 
Canada, 2001). This was first suggested in the Mackay Report. The inherent 
difficulty, if not impossibility, of measuring long-term economic benefits of 
restructuring actions taken today in response to competitive pressures means 
that the reports will likely be exercises in political correctness, serving no 
useful purposes yet costly to produce as public relations documents.  
The over-all effect of Bill C -8 would appear to be an increase in 
micro-management of some parts of the financial system, including through 
widespread discretionary powers left in the hands of the minister of finance. 
In addition to the waste of regulatory and compliance resources and so 
reduced competitiveness that this appears to involve, its economic costs are 
magnified by its inherently discriminatory nature  — aimed at the large 
institutions that the authorities can reach and leaving untouched many 
institutions that they cannot reach, including small federal institutions, all 
provincial ones, and foreign ones evolving through Internet operations.  
 
 
Survival of a Unique Canadian Financial System? 
 
A central issue for the future is not whether there will be a financial system in 
Canada that provides Canadians with necessary financial services. Rather the 
issue is whether that system will be made up essentially of Canadian 
institutions, ones that can draw on decades of experience to address 
effectively the needs of the Canadian economy and society. International 
competition, coming from all directions, will ensure that Canadians will have 
satisfactory financial services available to them, but it also means that with 
inappropriate Canadian p olicies non-Canadian institutions over the next 
decade will come to dominate the Canadian market and that Canadian 
institutions will slip into the role of minor players. 
There is a risk that this will happen under the policy directions included in 
Bill C -8 and the regulations and ad hoc discretionary policies that could 
emerge from it.  
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First, the large international institutions already encroaching on the 
Canadian market, and which will do so increasingly in the decade ahead, can 
do so with competitive efficiencies through economies of scale that large 
Canadian banks are, in practical terms, being denied by a restrictive and 
politicized merger policy.  
Second, increasing the limit on individual voting share holdings to 20 per 
cent from 10 per cent, with ministerial approval, prior to the restructuring of 
the larger Canadian financial institutions through mergers may make it 
possible for outside institutions to make strategic investments in major 
Canadian institutions with a view to having a preferred position when 
Canadian merger policy does begin to facilitate restructuring. While a 
Canadian institution could also make such a strategic investment, it seems 
highly unlikely that the minister of finance would permit two large Canadian 
banks to develop a relationship in that way while he might well approve a 
foreign bank doing so. Indeed, the government seems almost to invite this 
when it states in its news release that the larger shareholding “would allow 
these institutions to enter into substantial share exchanges, including the ability 
to enter into strategic alliances and joint ventures” (Finance Canada, 2001). 
Of course the very uncertainty overhanging such discretionary rule-making 
illustrates the difficulty that policy is imposing on the strategic planning of the 
larger Canadian financial institutions.  
Third, in recent years government policy has removed restrictions on the 
operations of foreign banks in Canada and the current bill will continue to 
give them the same investment and business powers as those of the Canadian 
banks. At the same time, because they will not be operating through extensive 
branch systems in Canada and some will use electronic systems almost 
exclusively, they will not face the regulatory burden of the large Canadian 
institutions. The Canadian banks meanwhile face regulatory obstacles in 
creating a branch system that is as low cost as possible — by placing great 
obstacles to consolidation through mergers, by requiring them to offer some 
services at low cost and by denying them the right to deliver life insurance 
products. 
Fourth, Bill C -8 in its impact continues to shield foreign financial 
institutions in the Canadian automobile leasing market, which they dominate, 
and prevents Canadian banks from even competing with them. 
Fifth, for Canadian institutions to become effective players in the 
emerging global market place will require them to develop strong market 
positions outside of Canada — not an easy challenge keeping in mind the size 
and market reach of their international competitors. Some Canadian banks 
have already closed a number of their foreign branches in the face of such 
competition while at the same time concentrating on getting a foothold in the  
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U.S. market — their only option if they wish to grow and retain some place 
in the international system. Canadian legislation and regulations that inhibit the 
Canadian banks from developing capital bases of competing size through 
mergers and that face regulatory obstacles for creating a system in Canada of 
maximum efficiency have the effect of favouring foreign institutions in both 
the Canadian and the international markets. Without more realistic policy in 
Canada their relative position is likely to continue to decline, as it has in the 
past several decades. 
It is rather surprising that Canadian policy would discriminate against the 
future success of its own large institutions and in favour of non-Canadian 
institutions, a bias clearly not rooted in economic logic or economic research. 
 
 
Short-Term Political Considerations versus  
Long-Term Financial System Needs 
 
Over the last decade and a half there has been an enormous amount of 
research on the functioning of the Canadian financial system and its 
regulation; and good research is indeed a necessary condition for good policy 
to emerge. But it is not at all a sufficient condition because of the decisive 
role that short-term political considerations can play.  
Political considerations have always been an important part of the process 
of amending banking and other financial services legislation and of 
government appraisal of mergers and other proposals.
9 The period 1900 to 
1930 was one of major consolidation within the banking system. The most 
significant example was the five mergers completed by the Royal Bank of 
Canada which helped it increase its size in terms of assets from just under 4 
per cent of the banking system to 27 per cent (Neufeld, 1992, p. 99). The 
mergers attracted the close and personal attention of the then minister of 
finance, who had concerns of a political nature, but in the end, and without 
great delay, they were for the most part permitted to go forward and so the 
necessary restructuring of the system was not unduly impeded.
10  
                                                             
9For a very interesting account of the interplay between the banks and the 
government, with emphasis on the period after the Second World War, see MacIntosh 
(1991). 
10For a detailed account of these mergers and how they came about see McDowall 
(1993, pp. 123-162).  
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What distinguishes the current period from previous ones is the extent to 
which political considerations are impeding restructuring of the system in the 
face of strong market pressures for change.  
Specifically, and by way of example, it is difficult to explain the following 
other than by short-term political considerations:  
 
·   Canadian policy that keeps potentially competitive Canadian institutions 
out of the foreign-dominated Canadian automobile leasing market;  
·   Canadian policy that prevents Canadians from buying life insurance at 
their local bank branch;  
·   ministerial rejection of bank merger proposals outright, as happened in 
1998, that is, without permitting the relevant regulatory agencies from 
determining if official concerns could be met by the applicants; 
·   introduction of very complicated bank merger policy procedures that, 
step by step, include major political hurdles;  
·   imposition of regulatory burdens on the system that are not based on 
serious research, that are not evenly applied across the system and that 
reduce the system’s economic efficiency; 
·   introduction of legislation that is replete with discretionary ministerial 
powers, thereby creating great uncertainty over what is acceptable to 
government and what is not.  
 
Even the two most important cases of banking industry restructuring of 
recent years went forward when they did largely because of the playing out of 
political forces and not because of coherent federal government policy relating 
to the needed restructuring of the system. The reference here is to the 
integration of investment and commercial banking and the integration of the 
banking and trust business. 
Consider first the integration of investment and commercial banking.
11 In 
February 1986 the federal government announced that Montreal and 
Vancouver would be permitted to form International Banking Centres. This 
was in response to local pressures for them and against the advice of a study 
headed by a former Governor of the Bank of Canada — and viewed by most 
everyone as essentially a political move on the part of the federal government.  
The Ontario government and the City of Toronto were very disturbed 
over this discriminatory decision, worrying about its impact on Toronto as a 
financial centre. Quebec even in the early 1980s had permitted outside 
ownership of its investment dealers, wishing to build up its province-based 
                                                             
11For a detailed discussion of how this came about see MacIntosh (1991, ch. 14).  
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financial sector. These moves finally pressured Ontario to change 
substantially its historic protectionist position concerning its investment 
dealers, with greater readiness to consider ways of strengthening them. 
Opening up that industry to more sources of capital was the most logical way 
to achieve this and in June 1986 the Ontario minister of financial institutions 
announced that they would permit banks and other financial institutions to 
own up to 30 per cent of an investment dealer. The chartered banks, sensing 
a major change in the political situation, began to lobby to be permitted to 
have wholly-owned dealers, but they made no immediate progress. 
Then in November 1986 another decision by a government agency, and 
the political rivalry that followed it, in effect decided the issue. The Quebec 
Securities Commission announced that it would permit the Bank of Nova 
Scotia to have a full service dealer in Quebec. Of course, the federal 
chartered banks were prohibited from acquiring such a dealer but the Bank of 
Nova Scotia achieved it under the “temporary investment powers ...” of the 
Bank Act. The Ontario government then clearly faced the possibility of a 
major shift of the dealer industry out of Ontario, and so began negotiations 
with the federal government concerning bank ownership of such dealers and 
how they might be regulated. By the end of the year both governments had 
accepted the idea of bank ownership and had agreed on how bank-owned 
dealers would be regulated by the two levels of government (the 
“Hockin-Kwinter Accord
12). This then led within several years to the 
acquisition of the major investment dealers by the banks and a very large 
infusion of capital into the investment dealer industry. The interplay of 
federal-provincial political forces had succeeded where rational economic 
arguments up to then had failed — they had brought about a fundamental 
change in the structure of the industry.  
The second example of how political exigencies rather than a clear 
understanding of the need for industry restructuring led to a desirable change 
in the structure of the industry is the integration of the banking and trust 
industries. A trust industry separate from banking was unique to Canada with 
even the United States having integrated it into the banking system at the end 
of the nineteenth century. Periodic failures among the smaller Canadian trust 
companies over the years had indicated problems in the industry, including 
corporate governance, economies of scale and regional diversification 
problems. The substantial similarity in activities between banks and trust 
companies because of the dominance of financial intermediation activities 
                                                             
12Named after the then federal minister of state (Finance) Tom Hockin and the then 
Ontario minister of financial institutions, Monte Kwinter.  
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over trust activities in the latter, had removed any rational justification for 
maintaining them as a separate industry. But both federal and provincial 
legislation had done so until the early 1990s. 
Then when the federal law was changed in 1992 making it technically 
possible for a widely-held bank to acquire a trust company, any merger 
proposal still was subject to the discretion of the minister of finance. One 
aspect of that discretion was the informal but firm policy of the federal 
government that “big shall not buy big”. But then with little advance warning 
Royal Trust, the largest Canadian trust company, ran into financial difficulties 
and faced the prospect of bankruptcy. Had it failed the Canada Deposit 
Insurance Corporation would have faced a large financial drain because of the 
guaranteed deposits of Royal Trust, which in turn would probably have 
required loans to it from the federal Consolidated Revenue Fund. Royal Bank 
of Canada, after several weeks of intensive due diligence investigations, made 
an offer which Royal Trust accepted and which was quickly approved by the 
minister of finance. Thus a “big” bank had acquired a “big” trust company. 
Within several years the largest part of the Canadian trust industry had been 
integrated into the banking system — a restructuring that had made perfectly 
good sense for years but had been opposed by federal and provincial policies. 
One aspect of this experience may still be of importance. The earlier rule 
“big shall not buy big” was presumably modified by the Royal Trust case to 
“big shall not buy big unless one of the big ones faces bankruptcy”. While this 
rule was ostensibly replaced by the articulated bank merger process outlined 
above, in fact the wide discretion left with the minister in that process means 
that the rule may still be very much in place. Yet were one of the big banks 
or insurance companies to face serious financial difficulties there is little doubt 
that federal government approval for a merger would come quickly.  
A policy that in effect stands in the way of a merger between healthy 
institutions and requires that one or other of them must be in financial straits 
before a merger is permitted would not appear to serve the system well. The 
merger of two healthy institutions, and the controlled integration that it 
permits, would preserve the strength of both; while waiting until one of the 
institutions finds itself in financial difficulties would risk wasting much of its 
valuable resources in terms of customer base and executive talent, to the 
advantage of other, including some foreign, institutions.  
There is a serious danger in permitting major aspects of restructuring to 
be driven by short-term political considerations. The danger is that the 
credibility of and the confidence in the official direction of financial system 
restructuring will be undermined. The “chill” that this has imposed on 
integration projects of individual financial institutions is probably already an 
important obstacle to restructuring among the larger Canadian financial  
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institutions, particularly the banks. It would today take courageous bank 
management to come forward with a merger proposal of any significance 
under circumstances where the project is to a substantial degree hostage to 




Summary and Conclusions 
 
 
Appraising the Canadian financial system against weaknesses revealed by the 
Asian financial crisis shows that in most respects, but with two vital 
exceptions, it is well positioned to survive the many challenges of 
globalization. Its strengths include the stable macroeconomic environment 
now that inflation is under control and budget surpluses permit a reduction in 
the public debt; a well-developed regulatory system with qualified regulators; 
increasing transparency in the operations of financial and other institutions; 
greater emphasis on corporate governance than in past decades; and a 
tradition of regular reviews of financial system statutes and regulations.  
However, the exceptions, and major weaknesses, are the failure of 
current restructuring policy to take into account how global forces are 
reshaping competitive institutions and the dominance of short-term political 
considerations at the expense of long-term national interest. There appears to 
be a presumption in Canadian policy that it can be indifferent to its impact on 
the economic efficiency, that is the cost base, of the large Canadian financial 
institutions, particularly the banks. The most costly example of this is the 
practical obstacles placed in the way of mergers. It is in Canada’s long-term 
interest to have at least a few strong and internationally competitive financial 
institutions, ones that know intimately the character and needs of Canada’s 
economy region by region. This requires policy to facilitate mergers that will 
achieve that objective. Current policy does not appear to lead to that outcome 
and risks persistent erosion of the Canadian aspects of the financial system 
and growing dominance of it by others. This process has already begun and 
the rapid changes occurring in international competition mean that this trend 
will not become less important. A change now in Canada’s restructuring 
policies could minimize future damage, but it could not undo damage already 
done. 
The fact that some of the major obstacles to necessary restructuring rest 
not in the legislation itself but rather in regulations and in the discretionary 
authority of the minister of finance, means that it would be possible to 
remove them relatively quickly. Removing them could ensure that Canada, in  
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the years to come, would retain something in the nature of a unique Canadian 
financial system with institutions that are internationally competitive and 
important. But this can happen only if there is policy leadership willing to put 
aside short-term political complications when making industry restructuring 
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